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Viruses cause some of the most dangerous infections. Laboratory work with viruses entails
hazards which should be faced rationally. Data are scarce but studies, particularly ofhepatitis,
are in progress and are extended to cover other infections also. Surveillance can provide facts
with which to correct theories and guide control measures. A simple and informal surveillance
scheme operated through membership of a professional association has proved useful and is
commended as a model.
The U.S.A. and Britain are among world leaders in concern and arrangements for
safety. Safety is an ideal concept, desirable but not attainable in absolute terms.
Practical planning for safety is hampered by the fact that safety is not measurable
directly but only as the converse of its opposite-in this case, danger. "Safety first"
is a useful slogan for propaganda but it is hard to imagine circumstances in life or
work where safety has first, as distinct from possibly second, priority. In the real
world all options, inaction as well as action, entail some risk and the best we can do
is choose wisely to minimize risks. Pursuit of absolute safety as an end in itself is
beset with pitfalls and impossibilities. It can be misrepresented by the media, politi-
cians, trade unions, and other interest groups. It creates its own vested interests and
industry, organizations, language, and literature to a degree that, by diverting effort
and resources, can threaten to obstruct work to conquer real dangers because of
purely theoretical hazards of such work. This does not mean that unreasonable risks
should be taken, that rational concern and planning for safety are wrong, or that
thoughtless and careless working are proper. What is necessary, though often dif-
ficult, is to keep in touch with reality and to base policies and procedures on logical
consideration of available relevant facts.
One area of concern in recent years has been laboratory work, in particular the
hazards of infection to workers and the general public. Traditionally these hazards
have been minimized by good technique in the broadest sense-good technique
which is necessary for the reliability of the laboratory work itself by avoiding con-
tamination and cross-infection. Some fears are irrational, grounded in superstitious
fears and alarmist exaggerations. In the past, a reasonable sense of proportion held
among most laboratory scientists in the microbiological field. The majority had ini-
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tial training in medicine or veterinary medicine and were familiar with the concepts
ofasepsis, virulence and pathogenicity, routes of infection, and epidemiology. With
this insight and using careful techniques, they experienced fewer accidental infec-
tions which resulted in clinical disease than their primitive equipment and facilities
might lead today's observers to expect. Despite modern advances, a new danger
threatens today since the explosion of methodology in recent years has brought in
numerous recruits primarily trained in biochemical and physical sciences, often
working with high concentrations of infectious agents but without the basic
understanding of infectious processes possessed by their predecessors. This justifies
a careful scrutiny and review of "laboratory infections" in the hope of increasing
understanding and awareness of infectious hazards and thus improving safety
without exaggerated fears or excessive restrictions.
ROUTES OF INFECTION
In the laboratory, as elsewhere, the main routes of infection are (a) percutane-
ous-overt or inapparent; (b) via mucous membranes contaminated by inhalation,
ingestion, or contagion, e.g., by rubbing or splashing the eye.
Airborne Infection
There are numerous sources of aerosols in laboratory work. Some are obvious,
e.g., homogenization. Others are less obvious: every make or break offluid surfaces
liberates some droplets. Large particles tend to fall, contaminating surfaces from
which they may infect by contact or by resuspension as secondary aerosols. Coarse
splashes can obviously contaminate grossly, impinging on surfaces and on the
workers whose eyes provide a receptive target draining into the respiratory and
alimentary tracts. The smallest particles can remain airborne for long periods, invisi-
ble and capable of penetrating deeply into the respiratory tract. If given the oppor-
tunity, many pathogens which do not normally spread by respiratory routes can in-
fect in this way. Rational precautions include good, basic technique to minimize the
production of aerosols, and sometimes the use of protective devices such as bio-
logical safety cabinets and plastic isolators. Unless properly designed, installed, and
operated these may give a false sense of security and even increase the hazard.
Careful manipulations to avoid generating aerosols in the first place remain essential
even when a "safety cabinet" is in use.
Ingestion
Various agents other than those which naturally spread by the fecal-oral route
may infect if swallowed, provided they are resistant to the pH, temperature, and en-
zymes ofthe upper alimentary tract. Others are too labile, but may yet infect the lips
or oropharnyx. Given good, basic technique, this route should not provide a haz-
ard-biological materials should never be mouth-pipetted, and obviously one
should not smoke, eat, drink, lick the fingers, or put laboratory items in the mouth.
Hands should be washed at the end of each laboratory procedure involving infec-
tious agents and protective clothing removed before leaving the laboratory.
Percutaneous Infection
Apparent percutaneous infection resulting from tissue penetration from ac-
cidents, particularly those involving sharp instruments or objects, or by gross con-
tamination of an unprotected injury, is an obvious and dangerous hazard. Inap-
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parent percutaneous infection constitutes a danger to which attention has only
recently become directed by considering the problems of hepatitis B. Whereas in the
past infections not obviously due to ingestion or injury tended to be regarded as air-
borne, the role of inapparent percutaneous infection deserves wider consideration.
The practical implications are clear: avoid contaminating the working environment,
minimize the use of sharp instruments, and protect the hands by suitable gloves.
Other Routes ofInfection
Particular hazards arise in the animal house from pre-established or experimentally
induced infections of the animals or their parasites, from scratches, bites, or other
injuries, or from contamination by contact, ingestion, or inhalation of infected
materials during work with or disposal of the animals. The same routes considered
above are involved.
Additional routes not normally relevant in the laboratory include transmission by
transfusion and intravenous injection, by transplantation of tissues or organs, and
by intimate personal contact particularly involving mucosal surfaces. Laboratory
workers are exposed to these other mechanisms ofinfection during their normal life
in the community, and the probable importance of non-occupational factors emerged
during studies of hepatitis B in clinical laboratory staff [1,2].
RECENT OBSERVATIONS
A large body of evidence about laboratory infections was amassed by Pike, who
analyzed world experience since the beginning of this century [3]. The data were
heavily weighted by events before the era ofchemotherapy and bythe changing pat-
tern of research on different groups of infectious agents over the period. The
populations at risk were unknown and attack rates could not be calculated. Despite
these limitations, the importance of certain factors emerged clearly. For instance,
accidents, particularly those involving skin penetration or exposure to aerosols, were
important. The most hazardous class ofactivity was "research" which accounted for
more than half of the infections. It is interesting that whereas rabies and smallpox
have both caused accidental infections during research [4-6] or vaccine production
[7] neither, to my knowledge, has done so as a result of the numerous diagnostic
tests for these viruses carried out for many years on a large scale in laboratories all
over the world, often with only simple facilities. No doubt immunization often
reduced the risks, but not completely in these four incidents.
Several surveys in Britain concentrated essentially on clinical laboratories.
Surveys by Harrington and Shannon between 1971 and 1974 revealed a pattern of
sickness absence and accidents similar to other working populations but with less
sickness absence than other comparable occupational groups [8-10]. Excess tuber-
culosis, diarrhea, dermatitis, hepatitis, and shigellosis were found in the laboratory
group.
Hepatitis
A series of surveys by questionnaire to members of the Association of Clinical
Pathologists concentrated on hepatitis. Since both numerators (cases of hepatitis)
and denominators (staff numbers in employment categories and laboratory
disciplines) were obtained, valid attack rates could be calculated to allow com-
parisons of incidence in various groups and trends over the years. Crude attack rates
showed a marked fall from 123 per 100,000 person years in 1970-1974 to 27 in
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workers, and only in these groups of bench workers were cases reported after 1974.
Follow-up of the 18 cases reported in 1975-1979 showed two altered diagnoses. Of
the remaining 16, six were confirmed acute hepatitis B infections by all laboratory
criteria, five with histories suggesting non-occupational sources of infection. Three
other presumed acute hepatitis B infections were not followed through to the disap-
pearance of HBsAg or acquisition of antibody. The remaining seven gave negative
tests for hepatitis B and comprised presumed hepatitis A and "Non-A Non-B" infec-
tions. Details were given in the ten-year summary [2].
Laboratory staff accounted for only 0.5 percent of hepatitis B infections reported
to the Communicable Diseases (Scotland) Unit in 1976-1979 and recorded for the
rest of Britain during 1972-1979 in Communicable Disease Reports [12,13] and the
marked decline after 1974 is reflected in these independent data. Since there had
been neither time nor resources to introduce by 1975 the strict control measures
recommended by the "Howie Report" [14] which was not published until 1978, the
improvement must surely have been due to increased awareness ofrisk and improve-
ments in operating procedures following other reports [15,16]. Since hepatitis B
spreads within laboratories by the parenteral route and yet few of the cases reported
overt injury or accident, it seems likely that inapparent routes ofparenteral infection
were important. Confirmation of widespread contamination within laboratories
testing infected specimens and using automated apparatus was published by Lauer
et al. in the U.S.A. [17] and in Britain by Newsom and Matthews [18]. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, if careful working to minimize contamination together with
minimal use of sharp instruments and protection of skin by disposable gloves suffice
to control the hepatitis B risk almost completely. The value of distinguishing "high-
risk" specimens by special labeling is doubtful if it gives a false impression that
unlabeled specimens can safely be handled casually! Dangerous assumptions that
materials not categorized as dangerous were therefore "safe" led to the Marburg
incident [19] and to an instructive accidental infection with trypanosomes in Glas-
gow [20,21] which was critically discussed in an accompanying editorial [22]. In this
latter case although the agent was thought to be non-infective to man, the worker
was a student (albeit medical), the work was a research procedure using high concen-
trations of the organism, and ungloved hands and fingers scratched by restraining
the animals were exposed to contamination-a dangerous combination of risk fac-
tors!
Other Infections
Pike reported a downward trend of laboratory-associated infections other than
hepatitis in recent years [23]. Extension of the British survey in 1979 to include other
infections as well as hepatitis revealed nine airborne infections (five tuberculosis,
four varicella), five enteral infections (four salmonella or shigella infections and one
case of hepatitis, not B, acquired on holiday), and one parenteral infection with
malaria [24,25]. This survey is being continued to collect sufficient data to allow
valid attack rates to be calculated and reveal trends and differences as was done for
hepatitis. A striking feature in 1979 was that, unlike hepatitis, these other infections
mainly involved microbiology workers, suggesting scope for improvement in tech-
nique and perhaps facilities. Recent experience in the U.S.A highlighted the infec-
tiousness of S. typhi, most infections with which now result from work with known
cultures for instructional or quality-control purposes [26]. Tuberculosis is a well
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recognized hazard fromsputum but a recentstudy in London [27] revealed the in-
creasing importance of extra-pulmonary tuberculosis and of other types of specimen
such as pus and urine. The postmortem room and animal house also remain areas of
risk from tuberculosis [24] as well as many other infections including viral zoonoses.
Virus infections have not been prominent in recent British experience of labora-
tory infections, though they include those pathogens classified as the most
dangerous. Work on highly dangerous pathogens is now strictly regulated in most
countries, but rules and regulations can be defeated by human error, gadgetry may
break down, and in the last analysis it remains essential that those working with such
pathogens remember and maintain good, and therefore safe, technique. Although
two incidents of smallpox infection from laboratories in Britain stimulated much of
the recent public and professional alarm about the dangers of such work, the main
lesson of the 1973 incident is the inadvisability of allowing visits by unvaccinated
persons while the work is in progress; despite generally unsatisfactory conditions
found by the subsequent enquiry [4] smallpox had not in fact "escaped" until then.
In spite of delay in clinical recognition ofthe case, the efficiency of control measures
was highlighted since no further spread occurred after the secondary cases were
diagnosed. Likewise no secondary cases arose from the episode in Birmingham in
1978 where again large amounts of infective virus were being worked with under
conditions which had become unsatisfactory long before infection "escaped." Which
if any of the faults then found was responsible for this infection or whether some
undetected and possibly human factor was involved remains uncertain. Fortunately
not every particle or droplet arising from infectious materials contains viable patho-
genic organisms; only a minority of virions are infective and not all of these survive
into the final inoculum, not every inoculum reaches receptive tissues, natural de-
fenses remove or destroy much of the challenge inoculum, not all of those viable
virions which reach the host's tissues make contact with the appropriate receptors of
a receptive host cell, and probably not every infective process initiated in one cell
successfully establishes a spreading infection in the host.
DISCUSSION
"The price of liberty is eternal vigilance," and this is true of laboratory infections.
The relevant vigilance is based on informed awareness of the materials and possible
pathogens under study, of the working environment, equipment, and procedures, of
possible and expected hazards. It includes proper organization of the work with ap-
propriate "safety measures" including immunization where appropriate, and
organized surveillance and vigilance at laboratory and community levels to monitor
infections possibly attributable to laboratory work by clinical and even serological
observations. Life and work are inevitably dangerous, and this is also true of
microbiological work for which professional fitness includes the necessary under-
standing and training directed to minimize risks and maximize safety. This is par-
ticularly important for the rising generation of young researchers who may work
with high concentrations of infectious agents by chemical and molecular biological
techniques. Unnecessary fears may arise if the realities of epidemiology, transmis-
sion routes, and pathogenic mechanisms are unfamiliar. Alternatively there may be
dangers from casual and careless working by those who are ignorant of the risks.
Finally, where a problem is so bedevilled with ignorance and misunderstanding
based largely on theorizing without data, epidemiologically sound facts are badly re-
quired. The ongoing survey, initially of hepatitis, organized through the member-
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ship of the Association of Clinical Pathologists and now extended with the help of
the Joint Working Party of the Royal College of Pathologists, Institute of Medical
Laboratory Scientists, Association of Clinical Biochemists, and Association of
Clinical Pathologists to cover other infections is commended as an example ofa sim-
ple mechanism capable of collecting valid data rapidly and without the distortions
which sometimes reduce the significance of more formally collected information.
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